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There are at least nine pension funds and eleven sovereign wealth funds currently in the world with 
more than $100 billion of Assets Under Management (AUM), compared to not a single one two 
decades ago. A handful of them manage close to one trillion dollars (Japan GPIF, Norway GPFG, 
Adia) and most of capital flowing into private equity – which is characterized as a complex and 
illiquid asset class – comes from these gigantic asset owners. 
 Recent evidence from Andonov, Bauer, and Cremers (2012), and Dyck and Pomorski 
(2012) shows that larger pension funds outperform smaller pension funds when it comes to 
investing in private equity; no difference in performance is found across fund size in traditional 
asset classes (fixed income and listed equity). These findings contrast with evidence of 
diseconomies of scale in other contexts (Chen et al. (2004) in mutual funds; Fung et al. (2008) in 
hedge funds; Lopez-de-Silanes, Phalippou, and Gottschalg (2013) in buyout funds).  
 Are these emerging gigantic asset owners poised to specialize and outperform in complex 
asset classes such as private equity? What do large asset owners do differently from small asset 
owners in private equity? This paper’s objective is to empirically document how asset under 
management impacts team size, specialization and scope of activities. 
We conduct a worldwide survey, which we present as a unique opportunity (for-free and 
anonymously) for Limited Partners (LPs) – the name given to the institutional investors who 
allocate capital into private equity funds – to benchmark their due diligence practices. We have 
contacted the nearly 2,000 LPs listed in the Limited Partners Directory published by the 
consultancy, Private Equity International. We have obtained 307 sufficiently complete responses 
spanning 30 countries. Respondents range from Pension Funds, Endowments, Foundations, to 
Fund-of-Funds and Family Offices. To our knowledge, this is the largest survey of private equity 
investors to date in terms of number of respondents, geographical coverage, and scope. 
We first measure team specialization. We ask whether the professionals in charge of private 
equity investing (for the LP) are also responsible for investing in real estate (a somewhat related 
asset class) or in hedge funds (an unrelated asset class, but that often goes under the same umbrella 
of ‘alternative investments’), and the fraction of investments that are made via fund-of-funds. 
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We find that LP size is significantly related to each team specialization proxies. Larger LPs 
(specifically, teams of investment professionals operating in organizations with larger allocations to 
private equity) are more likely to supervise only private equity funds and invest less via funds-of-
funds. Smaller LPs are thus less specialized. We also find that larger LPs outsource their due 
diligence to a similar extent as smaller LPs. Hence those smaller LPs that manage private equity 
alongside hedge funds and real estate are not just outsourcing more due diligence activities. Instead, 
this is a first indication that smaller LPs do less due diligence when investing in private equity.  
Investors’ scope of activities, including those outsourced, is also strongly related to LP size. 
Larger LPs engage more often in a wide range of due diligence activities, including legal activities 
(e.g. get side letters), accounting activities (e.g. develop their own models to evaluate funds 
reported Net Asset Values), co-investing in deals alongside the private equity funds they have 
committed capital to, visiting and interviewing portfolio company executives, sitting on private 
equity funds’ advisory boards etc. For each due diligence activity, larger LPs do more. Again, it is 
not the case that more activities are outsourced by smaller LPs, but rather that they are less likely to 
be undertaken by smaller LPs. In addition, we find that larger LPs spend more time evaluating a 
given investment proposal. 
Other investor characteristics such as investor’s experience, type (e.g. pension fund, 
Endowment), or location play no role. This means that, contrary to common belief, an LP that has 
been investing in private equity for only a couple of years has a similar scope of activities as an LP 
that has been investing in private equity for twenty-years, as long as their respective amount under 
management in private equity is similar. 
These results are robust to the inclusion of a number of control variables that account for 
alternative explanations. In particular, our results are unchanged if we control for either the fraction 
of the overall portfolio allocated to private equity or for the existence of performance based salary. 
Hence results are not driven by organizations exerting higher effort when PE is a more important 
part of their portfolio or when employees are better incentivized. 
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Larger LPs have a wider scope of activities and, as a consequence, count more 
professionals. The relationship between team size and LP size is statistically significant and 
positive, but slightly concave. There is an initial steep increase in the number of professionals as LP 
size goes from zero to $200 million. From $200 million to $600 million, the number of 
professionals stays at about 4. Beyond $600 million, team size increases but less rapidly than asset 
under management. The largest LPs have $400 million per professional, about twice as much as the 
smallest LPs. Yet, we find that it is LP size rather than the number of professionals that is most 
closely related to the scope of activities. 
If large LPs conduct more thorough due diligence, then small LPs should respond by free-
riding on large LPs decisions. We ask all investors to rank a large set of investing criteria, from 
most relevant to irrelevant. Consistent with smaller LPs free riding on larger LPs decisions we find 
that smaller LPs give a significantly higher score to the importance of the ‘commitments by other 
LPs’ as an investment criterion. In addition, smaller LPs give more importance to ‘advisor and 
gatekeeper opinion’. This is consistent with smaller LPs perceiving their due diligence as limited. 
Larger LPs give a significantly higher score to the importance of ‘fund size’ and the 
‘valuation of unrealized investments.’ To assess whether either the fund size or the valuation of 
unrealized investments is appropriate, it is necessary to have conducted a thorough due diligence. 
Smaller LPs are not in a position to judge the appropriateness of these two important investment 
criteria. This result is therefore consistent with the above findings. Finally, larger LPs give similar 
importance to the IRR obtained on the GPs’ previous funds as smaller LPs, but give significantly 
more importance to the ‘Multiple of previous funds.’ This is interesting in light of the literature 
showing that IRR is a poor measure of performance in private equity, while multiple is more robust 
and more closely related to Public Market Equivalent (see Harris, Jenkinson, and Kaplan (2013), 
Phalippou (2008)). 
Overall, our results are consistent with increasing return to scale for monitoring and 
screening when investing in a complex asset class such as private equity. In a nutshell, if little 
money is at stake it is not worth spending time looking into complex legal documents, difficult 
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valuation techniques for non-traded assets, etc. It is also not worth monitoring the funds because a 
small investor ‘cannot rock the boat’. In other words, returns on due diligence increase with size. If 
hiring a lawyer gets you an extra return of 0.1% per fund, a minimal size is required to make this 
hire.  
The consistency, magnitude and direction of these results are striking and somewhat 
puzzling. Economists since Adam Smith have observed that individuals tend to become more 
specialized as the size of the market increases. Once individuals specialize, economic institutions 
become necessary to structure relationships among them. Economists then debate whether (and 
when) markets or organizations govern these relationships most efficiently. The general view is that 
the outcome is what minimizes transaction costs between agents (see e.g. Garicano and Hubbard 
(2009)). In our context, this increased specialization happens within organizations, which is what is 
new and surprising. Most importantly, activities not carried out within the organization do not get 
carried out via markets; rather, many activities are not pursued at all in smaller organizations. 
Smaller organizations choose to not exert as much as an effort as larger LPs and instead free-ride on 
large LP decisions. If this was to be an ‘equilibrium’ most LPs should actually not do any due 
diligence at all and just rely on the choices of the large LPs.  
The increase in the number of large asset owners noted above implies that the amount of 
monitoring and screening activities is rising. This should tilt the balance of power towards investors 
and away from fund managers, consistent with i) accounting manipulation when fund-raising going 
down and be limited to small funds backed by small investors (as shown in Brown, Gredil, and 
Kaplan (2013), Barber and Yasuda (2013)); ii) increased disintermediation the trend being led by 
the largest investors (see Fang, Ivashina, and Lerner (2013)); and iii) access issues becoming 
second-order except maybe for relatively small specialized venture capital funds. Finally, our 
results are consistent with the findings of Andonov, Bauer, and Cremers (2012), and Dyck and 
Pomorski (2012) that larger organizations have higher returns when it comes to investing in private 
equity. We offer direct evidence that the source of this performance differential may be the more 
extensive monitoring and screening within larger organizations. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 
provides empirical evidence on investors’ organizational structure. Section 4 provides empirical 
evidence on the drivers of investors’ scope of activities. Section 5 focuses on the relation between 
team size and LP size. Section 6 examines investor investment criteria. Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. Data and investor characteristics 
We conduct an online survey of Limited Partners (LPs), i.e., Private Equity (PE) investors. Our 
questions relate to how LPs are organized, how they carry out their due diligence for investments in 
PE funds, and how they contract and monitor the General Partners (GPs) who run the PE funds. In 
this section, we describe the survey, provide key descriptive statistics, and assess our sample’s 
representativeness.  
 
2.1. Survey design 
The survey, which we designed with a senior LP executive, was offered to investors as a unique 
opportunity to (anonymously) benchmark their due diligence practices against that of a large set of 
other investors (for free). Respondents do not, therefore, have clear incentives to misrepresent any 
information. 
To construct our sample of respondents, we used the 2008 Directory of Limited Partners 
published by Private Equity International (PEI). We emailed all of the nearly 2,000 LPs listed in the 
directory to introduce the survey and to provide the website address for responses.1 After sending 
the email, we contacted each investor by phone to ask whether they received the email, intended to 
participate, or had any questions.2 Respondents to the survey could leave their contact details; two 
thirds have done so. When investors leave their contact details but do not answer some of the 
questions, we follow up by phone. 
                                                            
1 The Directory contains several organizations that are not LPs, such as GPs or investors that do not invest (or have 
stopped investing) in private equity. Excluding these, the population consists of 1,973 LPs. 
2 This could not be done in countries where English is not well spoken and where we did not have a research assistant 
fluent in the local language (e.g., Arab-speaking countries). However, these countries have very few investors. 
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We have received 307 responses, giving a response rate of 15.6%. This compares well to 
other academic large-scale surveys. For example, the CFO survey of Graham and Harvey (2001) 
had a response rate of 8.9%. We believe that this relatively high response rate reflects a significant 
interest in the investor community about how others perform due diligence.3 
 
2.2. Main investor characteristics and sample representativeness 
From the survey, we obtain LP characteristics that could explain heterogeneity in due diligence 
practices. Four of these characteristics are also available in PEI and can help us gauge the 
representativeness of our sample. In this sub-section, we describe these four investor characteristics. 
2.2.1. Investor type 
The first characteristic we collect is “LP type,” i.e. the nature of the parent organization. This is 
motivated by the study of Lerner, Schoar, and Wongsunwai (2007) who point out that an important 
source of heterogeneity across institutional investors is their organizational type. They find that 
endowments outperform, and conjecture a number of advantages that endowments have over other 
types of investors when it comes to investing in alternative asset classes in general, and in private 
equity in particular.4  
We classify LPs into five organizational types: i) Pension funds, ii) Fund-of-funds, iii) 
Endowments (which include foundations), iv) Financial institutions (banks, insurance companies, 
and asset managers), v) Other (sovereign wealth funds, family desks, corporate entities). 
The sample splits fairly equally across these five types, as shown in Table 1 – Panel A. Each 
of the largest two types (financial institutions and pension funds) represents about one quarter of the 
sample. The smallest type, endowments, represents 14% of the sample. Compared to the PEI 
universe we have slightly more pension funds (23% versus 19%), more fund-of-funds (19% versus 
                                                            
3 Groh, Liechtenstein, and Canela (2007) conduct a similar survey on how investors select venture capital funds. 
4 A recent study by Sensoy, Wang, and Weisbach (2013) shows that endowments no longer outperform. 
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11%), and slightly fewer investor in the financial, endowments and “other investor types” 
categories.5 We conjecture that funds-of-funds may find our survey more important because due 
diligence is at the core of their business. Overall, all categories are well represented. 
2.2.2. Region of LP location 
The second LP characteristic we look at is the country of location of the private equity investment 
committee (or the person taking the private equity investment decisions). Location may matter in 
several ways. Investors in North America (USA and Canada) may be seen as more prestigious and 
are likely to have access to a better labor market for asset managers; they are also geographically 
closer to the majority of private equity funds. Also the rules that investors and private equity funds 
need to follow vary across countries. Location is therefore a potential source of heterogeneity across 
investors.   
An important feature of our study is that it provides a global perspective, spanning 30 
different countries. Because we cannot include each country separately, we pool countries to form 
regions. As shown in Table 1 – Panel B, we distinguish between North America (USA and Canada), 
continental Europe (i.e. Europe excluding the UK and Scandinavia), Scandinavia, the UK, 
Australia, Japan, and the Rest of the World. North American investors are the largest group with 
32% of the respondents, continental Europe with 26%, Scandinavia with 13%, and the UK with 
11%. Next come two countries with a weight of 6% and 4% (Australia and Japan). The Rest of the 
World accounts for 8% of the sample and includes Iceland, Israel, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Singapore, South Africa, and South Korea.  
Compared to the universe, we have fewer North American investors and more European and 
Australian investors. Our high response rate in Scandinavia is mainly due to the higher willingness 
of investors in those countries to answer the survey. In North America we had difficulties reaching 
out to investors; yet, those investors represent the main group in our sample. 
                                                            
5 We mainly lag behind among corporate investors as it is difficult to identify the PE team in large organizations 
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2.2.3. LP size 
A view, articulated by Dyck and Pomorski (2012), and Andonov, Bauer, and Cremers (2012) is that 
there are large fixed costs of investing in complex asset classes such as private equity, and thus the 
dollar amount invested in private equity (LP size) should be the main distinguishing characteristic.6 
We split the sample into five about equal groups. Table 1 – Panel C shows the wide 
dispersion in capital allocated to private equity across investors. One investor in four has less than 
$100 million invested in private equity while another one in five investors has more than $2 billion 
invested in private equity. 
Compared to the universe, we have fewer very small investors (those with less than $100 
million in private equity). This group is less well staffed and spends much less resources in their 
investment process. Hence filing our survey is more costly for them and they may see little benefit 
in participating. In the other size categories, we closely match the proportions of the PEI directory. 
 
2.2.4. LP experience 
In asset classes characterized by a large asymmetry of information, such as private equity, 
investor’s experience may be a distinctive factor. It is often argued that early movers in the private 
equity industry are at an advantage, with the endowments of Yale University and Harvard 
University often cited as examples (cf. Swensen (2000), Sensoy, Wang, and Weisbach (2013)). In 
addition, more experienced investors may behave differently as they may have learnt over time how 
to perform “better” due diligence. They may also need less effort because they are more productive. 
Our sample and the PEI universe are very close on that dimension (Table 1 – Panel D), with an 
under-representation of very long-established investors (over 15 years of experience). 
< Table 1> 
 
                                                            
6 We ask LPs the amount they invest in buyout and the amount they invest in venture capital. The sum of the two is the 
amount the Limited Partner invests in private equity (LP-size). 
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3. Organization Structure and Human Resources  
3.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for investor characteristics that can be broadly referred to as 
organizational structure and human resources management. Panel A shows statistics for continuous 
variables, and panel B shows statistics for binary variables. 
 We first look at an LP’s parent organization, say the insurance company or pension fund 
which owns it. The parent organization may play a role in the choice of due diligence activities. An 
‘old’ parent (e.g. a 200 years old insurance company) may have accumulated substantial due 
diligence experience, may be perceived as a prestigious employer or as a prestigious client, and may 
have established a strong network of connections that facilitate information gathering. We construct 
Parent experience as the number of years it has been in operation up to 2008. On average the parent 
organization is 38 years old (Table 2 – Panel A). A parent with a large amount of assets under 
management may represent a larger pool of ‘potential’ money, giving the LP higher bargaining 
power. We observe a wide range of parent AUM in our sample, with the 25th percentile at $0.6 
billion and the 75th percentile at $13 billion.  
In terms of staffing, we find that the average private equity investment team is composed of 
7.8 (full time equivalent) investment professionals, with an obvious skew in the distribution. The 
25th percentile investor has only 1.5 investment professionals, and even the 75th percentile investor 
has 8. However, the number of investment committee members is more narrowly and evenly 
distributed with an average of 6.7 members and an inter-quartile range of 4 to 8 members. 
Interestingly, note that the inter-quartile range for the investment committee members is similar to 
what has been identified in the literature as the optimal size for corporate boards (see Adams, 
Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010)). 
Next we turn to some variables that measure how money is deployed into private equity. We 
first compute the allocation to private equity as the ratio of LP size to Parent size. This variable 
provides a clear measure of how important private equity is for the parent’s investments. The PE 
allocation varies widely with a quarter of the investors having less than 4% of their funds allocated 
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to private equity while another quarter of the investors have more than 77%. The high end of the 
distribution is driven by fund-of-funds with 100% of their assets allocated to private equity. 
The number of funds LPs invest into is interesting in light of the recent debate on investors 
decreasing the number of funds they hold. The inter-quartile range here is 10 to 62. This seems 
quite large, given the small number of investment professionals mentioned above. Taking the ratio 
we find that on average one professional is responsible for 16.8 funds, with substantial variation 
across LPs. We can look at staffing from another angle by considering the amount of dollars per 
professional: we find a rather high average of about $200 million per professional. This distribution 
seems to be similarly skewed, since 25% of the organizations operate with less than $48 million per 
professional. 
Another view on organizational heterogeneity is that it is the characteristics of the 
individuals who manage the capital that drive any observed heterogeneity rather than investor’s 
organization. For example, the individuals experience in the industry or their personal network may 
have a first order effect on how investments are done (Kaplan, Sensoy, and Strömberg (2009)). 
 We find that the experience of the members of the private equity investment committee – 
defined as the number of years they have been in the industry – is 11 years on average. But the 
dispersion across LPs is not very marked.  
We also ask how many people have left the investment committee over the previous five 
years; we define as turnover the ratio of this number to the number of the investment committee 
members. This measure is motivated by the conjecture in Lerner, Schoar, and Wongsunwai (2007) 
that certain types of organizations (e.g. pension funds) are more prone to staff turnover, with a 
negative effect on due diligence. More than a quarter of the organizations have had no turnover at 
their investment committee, with the average having one in four members leave their job over the 
previous five years. Still, a quarter of the LPs experiences substantial turnover, with over 40% of 
their IC members leaving during the previous five years.7 The last variable in Panel A is the fraction 
                                                            
7 Since almost one fifth of the LPs does not have an IC, the number of observations is lower for this variable. 
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of fund-of-funds in the PE portfolio. This is a measure of extent to which LPs delegate the 
investment decision to specialized intermediaries. Many investors have none but the average 
investor has 18% of its funds that are fund-of-funds. 
Table 2 – Panel B reports the frequency of several binary variables. In order to gauge the 
degree of specialization of the PE investing team, we ask whether the private equity team is also 
responsible for hedge funds or real estate funds. Hedge funds, real estate and PE are all often 
classified as ‘alternative investments.’ Although there can be some overlap between real estate and 
private equity in terms of investment skills because the investment structure is similar (private 
partnerships), there is little to no overlap in terms of hedge fund and private equity investment 
skills. 
Perhaps surprisingly, then, a striking 26% of LPs’ teams are also responsible for hedge fund 
investments. A higher fraction of the teams (37%) are responsible for both real estate investments 
and private equity investments. 
The next variable considers that LPs may choose to delegate due diligence to specialized 
intermediaries. About half of the LPs say that they outsource part of their due diligence. Therefore, 
in the questions we ask about due diligence practices we always specify that we are asking for tasks 
that are carried over either in-house or outsourced.  
 The large majority of organizations have an investment committee (82%). Few committees 
vote with majority rule (24%); most require a consensus decision. Most committees are autonomous 
(79%), meaning that their decisions cannot be modified or vetoed by anyone external.  
 Our last set of survey questions looks at human resource management and compensation 
policy. Just short of half of the organizations (45%) offer compensation pegged to financial 
performance; interestingly, this holds both for the investment committee members and non-
members. In 38% of the cases, the variable part of the salary can be larger than the fixed part of the 
pay for the investment committee members, and in 28% of the cases for other professionals. This 
fact is quite recent, as 32% of the respondents say that the compensation policy has changed over 
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the past ten years and bonuses were introduced. This shows a very important change, since 
compensation constitutes a key incentive for investment decisions.  
 Such reliance on performance-related pay may be surprising because returns of private 
equity funds are notoriously difficult to measure, and they take a very long time to materialize. 
Interim Net Asset Values (NAV) reported by fund managers are thus likely to play a role in the 
bonus of the investing team. Given that the calculation of the NAV contains some element of 
subjectivity, this can lead to conflicting interests in that both the PE investing team and the fund 
manager may accept inflated NAVs in some circumstances. 
< Table 2 > 
 Overall, Table 2 provides for the first time large-scale evidence on the internal organization 
and human resources of LPs. Notably, it documents that the degree of specialization significantly 
differs across LPs. We now turn to studying how LP characteristics are related to these differences. 
 
3.2. LP size, team specialization and outsourcing 
We first ask whether LP size affects the specialization of the investment team. As in subsequent 
regressions, we employ a standard set of explanatory variables that include the four LP 
characteristics described in section 2.2: LP type, location, size, and experience, to which we add the 
experience of the LP’s parent. The first two specifications in Table 3 present results from Probit 
regressions.8 In the first (second) specification, the dependent variable is a dummy variable that 
takes the value one if the team in charge of private equity investing declares that it is also in charge 
of hedge fund (real estate) investing, and is zero otherwise. In the third specification, which is 
estimated by Tobit, the dependent variable is the fraction of the PE portfolio that is invested in PE 
fund-of-funds; this variable takes a value between 0% and 100%. 
                                                            
8 We exclude fund-of-funds from this analysis because the value of each of the four dependent variables is the same for 
all of them by definition. 
   14
We find that three explanatory variables are significant. Pension funds, Endowments (which 
include foundations) and smaller LPs are more likely to have teams in charge of multiple asset 
classes and are more likely to invest via fund-of-funds. These LPs are therefore less specialized.  
< Table 3 > 
4. Investors Scope of Activities 
We measure a variety of activities that span different dimensions of investing. We then aggregate 
individual activities into a summary measure of investor activity scope. As in the previous section, 
we look first at descriptive statistics to see what is in the ‘black-box’ and then study cross-sectional 
differences. 
 
4.1. Track record evaluation: Accounting and actuarial activities 
A key element LPs consider when deciding to invest is past performance. An important challenge in 
the evaluation of a track record is the valuation of Net Asset Values (NAVs), i.e., the valuation of 
unrealized investments in portfolio companies. For example, Kohlberg, Kravis and Roberts (KKR), 
an eponymous buyout firm, shows in its annual report that 80% of all of their investments in dollar 
terms are un-exited (Source: SEC filings, 2013). This means that the past return that LPs see is 
largely relies on subjective valuations of unrealized investments. Hence prospective investors may 
want to re-evaluate NAVs. Item 1 in Table 4  shows that 31% of investors do so. 
In addition, performance figures so provided are often overly aggregated. For example, a GP 
may have pooled together investments in venture capital and buyout and is now raising a buyout 
fund. Another such situation arises when a GP with high returns in its early funds but not in its later 
funds would pool all the funds together and give only one aggregate performance number. Another 
example is that some GPs may include in the past performance figure the returns of the investments 
that some of the partners supervised when working for their previous employer. An investor also 
told us that the dates of cash flows need to be checked because it is not always the date at which 
actual cash flows occur that is used (e.g. announcement dates may be used in some cases). For all 
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these reasons, an LP may want to compute is own past performance measure. Item 2 in Table 4 
shows that 58% of the LPs always do so (Only 9% of the investors never do so; non-tabulated). 
Finally, Item 3 shows that 77% of the investors always benchmark GPs track records. 
< Table 4 > 
4.2. Contract evaluation: Legal activities 
The contractual rights of an investor in a private equity fund are governed by the Limited 
Partnership Agreement (LPA).9 The LPA is an important document and details the fees to be paid 
by the LP to the GP, and all legal covenants covering their relationship. Because the fees can have a 
large impact on performance and because the inclusion and exclusion of certain covenants can 
significantly impact potential conflicts of interest, comparing the LPAs of different funds is an 
important exercise. It is also a costly one, given that LPAs are quite technical and lengthy 
documents (typically over 100 pages). Item 4 of Table 4 shows that 67% of investors benchmark 
the LPAs (sometimes or always).  
Since the late 1990s, some LPs have obtained special rights that are granted via separate 
"side letters". Common reasons given for these are that an investor is considered as strategic, or as 
large client, or the investor is subject to government regulation (e.g., ERISA, the Bank Holding 
Company Act, or public records laws). In addition, LPs may negotiate for a “Most Favored Nation” 
(MFN) provision that permits the election of certain benefits granted to other LPs via side letters. In 
general, MFN guarantees that the investor has the best terms granted to any other investor. It is 
unclear whether any of these side letters are favors granted to investors or whether certain investors 
need these to clear some internal regulations (e.g. in terms of Corporate Social Responsibility). 
Either way, an investor asking for side letters engage in legal activities. 
 Items 5 and 6 in Table 4 show that 45% of the investors always obtain side letters and 39% 
of the investors always obtain the MFN clause. As these two proportions are similar, it is likely that 
                                                            
9 Gompers and Lerner (1996), Metrick and Yasuda (2010) study contracts between private equity funds and their 
investors. Sahlman (1990) describes some agency problems in venture capital organizations and how the contracts and 
operating procedures have evolved in response. 
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there are only two LPAs: the default one and a special one, both of which are granted to a large 
group of investors.  
We also ask, more broadly, whether they negotiate contract terms and 63% report that they 
always do (only 13% report never doing so). This may be in contrast to common belief as well. The 
LPA is not a take-it-or leave-it proposition by the GP, but is a document investors negotiate on. 
 
4.3. Direct investment activities: Co-investments and executive interviews  
A growing phenomenon in private equity is that of co-investing (Phalippou (2009)): GPs invite LPs 
to co-invest in a specific company, without charging additional fees (or charging much less). 
Engaging in co-investments is de facto a reduction in the overall fee bill for the investor. In 
addition, GPs may overweight the selected LPs in the best investments and therefore squeeze out 
the non-participating LPs. Also in this case, the gross-of-fees performance would be higher for 
participating LPs.  
LPs participating in co-investments engage in extra and costly due diligence to screen co-
investment opportunities. This is surprising at first sight because a co-investment is just an increase 
in an existing investment in a given company at no extra cost. However, co-investments increase 
career concerns. No-one would get fired from investing in Blackstone or Bain capital, but one could 
get fired for undertaking two co-investments that performed poorly; hence the extra due diligence. 
We find that 80% of the investors in our sample have been invited at least once to co-invest. 
This is a remarkably high number given the diversity of our participants. However, we find that the 
average invitee rejects on average a staggering 81% of the invitations.10 Overall, 56% of the 
respondents have made at least one co-investment (item 8 in Table 4). 
A related activity for investors is to interview executives of portfolio companies. The 
objective is to gain insight on whether the GP adds value to the portfolio companies. As in co-
                                                            
10 Recently, Fang, Ivashina, and Lerner (2013) collected for the first time data from seven large LPs and study the 
returns on co-investment programs. Reassuringly, they  report a similar finding: “According to our interviews, some of 
the institutions pick less than 5% of deals available to them.” 
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investments, this requires LPs to know about company-investment processes. In these interviews, 
LPs assess whether the GP has a good reputation with entrepreneurs and executives which is an 
important factor for assessing the quality of future deal flows. Item 9 in Table 4 shows that 43% of 
the investors “always” interview portfolio company executives (48% do it sometimes, 9% never do 
it; non-tabulated). 
 
4.4. Monitoring activities 
Unlike the monitoring of portfolio companies by the GP, the monitoring of the GP by the LP is an 
issue that has not been covered in the literature. It may be because LPs cannot intervene in fund 
decisions so that monitoring does not appear necessary at first sight. In fact, monitoring is useful in 
case the investor considers selling its stake in a fund, or purchasing more, in the secondary market. 
But the most important reason to monitor is to prepare for due diligence for the reinvestment 
decision at the next fund-raising.11 LPs can monitor through a wide range of different actions, most 
of which are difficult to quantify. We ask three questions to assess monitoring activities. 
First, investors can monitor fund managers by accepting a seat on fund advisory boards, 
provided they are invited to do so by the fund managers.12 Advisory boards include limited partners 
and are often designed to provide access to deals or technical expertise. Further, advisory boards are 
less formal (and have no legal obligations) than corporate boards of directors, while also providing 
guidance and oversight for the operation of the fund, including portfolio company valuations. Half 
of the respondents have at least one board seat (item 10). 
Second, investors may monitor by keeping track of the composition of their underlying 
investments in terms of industry, deal size and country. This facilitates the next round of due 
diligence, might trigger some intervention on the secondary market, or exert some pressure for 
                                                            
11 Fraser-Sampson (2007) argues that “Once made, the investment needs to be monitored. You want to know that the 
firm is sticking to its agreed investment model, that it is investing efficiently, and that the team dynamics are still as 
they were when you carried out the due diligence.” 
12 Considerable research has been devoted to studying the boards of public companies (see Adams, Hermalin, and 
Weisbach (2010), for a survey). We are not aware of work on the advisory boards of PE funds. 
   18
action on the fund managers. Almost all the investors (84%) track the composition of their PE 
portfolio. 
 Third, and finally, we use visits to portfolio companies (those held by the funds in which the 
LP is invested) as another proxy for monitoring activities. Given that it is a time-consuming action 
that may require travelling and knowledge about which questions to ask etc., it is not a systematic 
practice. Relatively few LPs say they always do it (8%). A much larger share (61%) sometimes visit 
portfolio companies, but as many as 32% of the respondents never do so.  
 
4.5 Determinants of investors’ scope of activities 
For each of the twelve activities described in sub-sections 4.1 to 4.4, we show the frequency of 
them being undertaken in Table 4, and split this frequency by LP size: column (ii) for small 
investors (those in the bottom tercile of LP size), and column (iii) for large investors (those in the 
top tercile of LP size). For each and every activity, we observe that small investors are less likely to 
undertake an activity than large investors. Some particularly significant differences are found for 
legal activities (e.g. 23% of small investors always obtain side letters versus 73% of large investors) 
and for advisory board seats (29% of small investors have at least one board seat versus 68% of 
large investors).   
 To capture investors’ scope of activities in a single variable, we take the fraction of activities 
pursued by each investor. Some pursues none of the twelve activities and get a score of 0; some 
pursue them all and get a score of 100%.13 Figure 1 shows the histogram of investors’ scope of 
activities. 
< Figure 1 > 
Table 5 shows results from Tobit regression analysis in which investors’ scope of activities 
is the dependent variable. Explanatory variables include the standard set of variables we used in 
                                                            
13 This is reminiscent of the construction of corporate governance indices such as that of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(2003). For investors that do not respond to all questions, the compute the fraction among the questions they do answer. 
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Table 3: LP size, experience, type, location, and Parent experience. We then add one at a time each 
of the investor characteristics as listed in Table 2.14 In the interest of space we show only those that 
are either statistically significant or of particular interest. 
< Table 5 > 
The results show LP size to be a highly significant determinant of LP activity scope. This 
effect is also economically relevant: the last row of Table 4 shows that moving from the first to the 
third tercile increases the investor activity scope measure by nearly 70%. The effect of LP size 
remains quite stable across specifications. Only being a financial firms has a fairly consistent effect 
(negative) on the scope of activity; also more experienced LPs are less active. 
Some of the additional explanatory variables from Table 2 also have a significant effect on 
investor activism. Organizations with larger amounts of capital may have different internal 
departments (legal, accounting) which could facilitate a broader scope of activities better than the 
amount of capital deployed in private equity alone. Results in specification (i) show that it is indeed 
the case. Yet LP size is the dominating explanatory variable for investors’ scope of activities. 
The next three specifications use different proxies for staffing as extra control variables 
(columns (ii), (iii), and (iv)). We find that better staffed LPs have a larger scope of activities. LPs 
with more PE professionals have a wider scope of activities. Similarly, both the number of funds 
per investment professional and the assets under management per investment professional are 
strongly negatively related to scope of activities. Yet, even after account for staffing does not affect 
the economic and statistical significance of LP size. 
                                                            
14 Most of these characteristics are drawn from Lerner, Schoar, and Wongsunwai (2007) who list potential explanations 
for why some investors may perform better in venture capital. They conjecture that better performing investors – 
endowments in their sample – find it easier to retain employees (i.e. experience lower turnover), may have less 
conflicting objectives, and may be more likely to have incentive-pay schemes, enjoy more freedom/autonomy, attract 
more experienced employees, or rely more on soft information. 
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In addition to these organizational characteristics, the allocation to private equity may also 
matter. Organizations with relatively little money in private equity may not find it worthwhile to 
undertake many different due diligence activities. Another potentially important variable could be 
the existence of incentive pay. The idea being here as well that without steep financial incentives 
LPs may undertake less due diligence initiatives. Specifications (v) and (vi) of Table 5 show that 
these two variables are not statistically significant. This shows that the effect of LP size is not 
driven by organizations exerting higher effort on a more important part of their portfolio (when PE 
allocation is high) or because employees are better incentivized (when professionals receive 
performance-based salary).15 Also, we notice that LP size is a significant determinant of each single 
component of the investor activity scope measure; in other words, the significance of size does not 
rely on aggregation. Finally, we look at the results if we exclude LPs that are investing more in 
venture capital and do not find any difference in results (Table 6 –column (i)). 
 
4.6 Endogeneity 
LP size is to a certain extent endogenous and we ought to think about how this may affect our 
inference. The most likely story we can think of is one of reverse causality that would go along 
these lines: some investors are born more thorough than others and that makes them more 
successful. Because they are more successful, they end up with more money to manage. Hence it is 
scope that implies high LP size and not vice versa.  
We offer four tests of this reverse causality hypothesis. First, we ask investors how much 
their allocation depends on their own past performance, versus the overall industry performance 
(which is obviously exogenous to LP size). We thus take advantage of the fact that in practice many 
investors decide on their asset allocation using past performance figures reported for the overall 
asset class. Some adjustments may or may not be made for the anticipated outperformance of the 
industry average. Investors, on average, indicate that about half of their decision is based on 
                                                            
15 Among the other variables that do not to affect investor activities are the IC turnover rate, the average experience of 
IC members, and the autonomy of the IC decisions. 
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external factors but this percentage varies widely. In column (ii) of Table 6 we report results from 
the baseline model of Table 5 where we exclude from our sample LPs that reply that more than half 
of their allocation decision is due to their own past performance. Despite the reduction in sample 
size, LP size remains statistically significant, contradicting the reverse causality hypothesis 
Second, column (iii) of Table 6 reports results from a regression where we exclude fund-of-
funds, which is the category of LPs with arguably the most endogenous LP size. LP size remains 
statistically significant. 
 Third, we exclude LPs that have more than 10 years of track record. Ten years being the 
usual duration of a private equity fund, these LPs are expected to have few, if any fully liquidated 
fund in their portfolio from which they can learn about their investing abilities. That is, they have 
little, if any, performance-related information upon which their size could depend. Results are 
shown in column (iv) of Table 6: LP size remains statistically significant. 
Fourth, as noted above, if we control for the fraction of the parent organization allocated to 
private equity, which under the reverse causality hypothesis, should be the driving force, then we do 
not observe any changes in the coefficient on LP size. 
Overall, we conclude that the data do not support a reverse causality story, and rather 
suggest that our results genuinely reflect a causal effect of LP size on investors’ scope of activities.  
< Table 6 > 
4.7 Time spent in due diligence 
We now look at how much time LPs spend on due diligence activities. In the survey, we ask 
investors how many (full time equivalent) days of work they typically put in doing due diligence 
work for each of three types of funds: first-time funds, seasoned funds of GPs in which the investor 
is not already invested, and reinvestment decisions (“re-ups”). The respective results from a 
regression analysis are shown in Table 7 columns (i) to (iii). We find that LP size has again a 
positive and significant effect throughout. Interestingly, the effect is strongest in the case of first-
time funds, where uncertainty is highest.  
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Column (iv) reports results from a Probit regression for whether an LP chooses to outsource 
part of the due diligence. Table 3 showed that larger LPs are less specialized, i.e., they are more 
likely to have teams devoted only to private equity investments. Although they are less specialized, 
these LPs might outsource more due diligence activities in order to compensate for the less time and 
focus they have for private equity investing. In column (iv), then, the dependent variable is a 
dummy variable that takes the value one if the team declares that part of the due diligence activities 
are outsourced (and is zero otherwise).  
We find that several investor characteristics are related to the likelihood of outsourcing. 
Pension funds, endowments, investors located in places other than North America and Continental 
Europe, less experienced LPs, and those with older parent organizations are all more likely to 
outsource due diligence. However, larger LPs are equally likely to outsource part of their due 
diligence as small LPs. Hence those small LPs that manage PE alongside hedge funds and real 
estate are not just outsourcing more each type of due diligence. This is a clear indication that 
smaller LPs do less due diligence when investing in private equity, even taking outsourcing into 
account.  
< Table 7 > 
 
5. Team size 
It is interesting to look at these results through the lens of organizational economics theories and in 
particular the literature on the productivity of teams of specialists. Fundamentally, there should a 
trade-off between increasing the scope of knowledge and the higher coordination cost that stems 
from larger teams (see, e.g., Becker and Murphy (1992)). The implication is that as more money is 
being managed, team size should go up but team members should specialize in order to minimize 
coordination costs. The above results seem consistent with this view. 
In this sub-section we take a closer look at the interaction between team size and the amount 
of capital under management (LP size). We first run regression analysis with the number of PE 
   23
professionals (team size) as dependent variable. Results in table 8 show that the relationship 
between team size and LP size is statistically significant, positive, and slightly concave. 
Team size, however, is not related to the number of funds in the portfolio. This is surprising 
because the workload is more likely to be proportional to the number of funds rather than to the 
amount under management. Investing $100 million in one fund should require much less staff than 
investing $5 million in twenty funds. Our results show instead that as LP size goes up, the 
workload, all else equal, does not increase as fast, and the slack is absorbed by the LP doing more 
activities. This is consistent with the above results. 
Table 9 documents these relationships using descriptive statistics broken down by LP size 
deciles. The smallest LP decile contains LPs with less than $41.8 million under management in 
private equity. The largest LP decile contains LPs with over $3.7 billion under management in 
private equity. 
 We observe an initial steep increase in the number of PE professionals as LP size goes from 
zero to $200 million. From $200 million to $600 million, the number of PE professionals stays at 
about 4. Beyond $600 million, team size increases but less rapidly than asset under management. 
The largest LPs have $400 million per employee. 
 The number of funds also goes up with LP size but when we look at the number of PE 
professionals per fund, it tends to go slightly up. Of interest, we note that the scope of activities 
increases monotonically across LP size deciles.  
< Table 8 > 
< Table 9 > 
 
6. Fund selection criteria 
From the above results, it seems that when there is a pot of PE capital of (say) $100 million, there is 
one person doing everything; when the pot grows to $200 million, someone else is hired and more 
due diligence activities are undertaken etc. When there are 100 people in the PE team, one 
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individual specializes in accounting (e.g. converting NAVs into market values), one specializes in 
track record benchmarking, one specializes in legal due diligence, and so on.  We are not aware of 
industrial organization and labor division theories that have this prediction. It is particularly difficult 
to imagine in a general equilibrium because small teams should just free-ride on the large teams 
decisions. While it is possible that some funds may be closed to small investors the vast majority of 
funds, especially so in buyout are basically open to all. 
We ask investors to rank a large set of investing criteria that they use to select funds. This 
question is asked separately for three types of funds: first-time funds, seasoned funds of firms in 
which the investor is not already invested, and reinvestment decisions (“re-ups”). We then 
consolidate their answers across all three sets of questions and standardize them so they are 
comparable across investors.16 
Table 10 show results from regression analysis. The five retained specifications correspond 
to the questions whose score was most significantly related to LP size.17 
First, smaller LPs give a significantly higher score to the importance of the ‘commitments 
by other LPs’ as an investment criterion (Table 10, column (i)). This is consistent with smaller LPs 
free riding on larger LPs decisions. Second, smaller LPs also give more importance to ‘advisor and 
gatekeeper opinion’ (Table 10, column (ii)). This too is consistent with smaller LPs believing that 
their due diligence is limited. These two results are consistent with the above findings: larger LPs 
conduct more thorough due diligence, hence pays little attention to both external advice and what 
others do.  
Third, we find that the criterion receiving the largest score is past performance, measured as 
either IRR or Multiple (i.e. total amount distributed divided by total amount invested). This result 
echoes common arguments such as that of Peter Dolan of Harvard Management Company, quoted 
in Lerner, Hardymon, and Leamon (2005): “When you commit to a venture capital fund as a limited 
                                                            
16 Specifically, we subtract to each score the average investor score to that question and divide by its standard deviation. 
Table A1 in the Appendix reports the distribution of the full set of fund selection criteria. 
17 Other investor characteristics are seldom significantly related to investment criteria. 
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partner, you’re tying up your money for ten years based on someone’s past performance”. Such 
evidence is also consistent with empirical studies in private equity showing that fundraising is 
strongly related to past private equity return (Kaplan and Strömberg (2009), Gompers and Lerner 
(1998)).  
Yet, the importance of past performance is unclear. Phalippou (2010) and more recently, 
Brown, Gredil, and Kaplan (2013) show that past performance, if computed at the time of fund-
raising, does not predict future performance; similar to what is for mutual funds (Sirri and Tufano 
(1998) and hedge funds (Fung et al. (2008)). 
The literature has also pointed out that performance measures such as the IRR are often 
misleading in a private equity context while Multiple is a more robust measure of performance 
(Harris, Jenkinson, and Kaplan (2013), Phalippou (2008)). 18% of the respondents select past IRR 
as the most important criteria while only 13% of the respondents select Multiple as the most 
important. Most interestingly, Table 10, column (iii) shows that larger LPs give a significantly 
higher score to past Multiple than do smaller LPs. For IRR, smaller LPs tend to give a better score 
but it is not statistically significant. 
Fourth, larger LPs give a significantly higher score to the importance of both ‘fund size’ and 
‘valuation of unrealized investments.’ To assess whether either the fund size or the valuation of 
unrealized investments is appropriate, it is necessary to have conducted a thorough due diligence. 
One interpretation is that smaller LPs are not in a position to judge the appropriateness of these two 
important investment criteria, consistent with our findings on investors’ scope.  
These results are consistent with increasing return to scale for monitoring and screening 
when investing in an asset such as private equity funds. Returns on monitoring and due diligence 
seem to be increasing with size. 
< Table 10 > 
 
  
   26
7. Conclusion 
It has been argued that the best private equity partnerships do not increase fund size or fees to 
market-clearing levels. Instead they have rationed access to their funds to favor their most 
prestigious investors (e.g. Ivy League university endowments). Further, industry observers (e.g. 
Swensen (2000)) have often argued that endowments are better equipped to assess and evaluate 
emerging alternative investments, such as private equity, in which asymmetric information 
problems are especially severe. Lerner, Schoar, and Wongsunwai (2007) document that improved 
access, as well as experience of investing in the private equity sector, led endowments to 
outperform other institutional investors substantially during the 1990s. However, private equity is 
no longer an emerging and unfamiliar asset class. 
 Nowadays, investors such as the Canadian CPPIB and the Dutch AlpinInvest have built 
private equity portfolios worth over $35 billion each in just a decade (both started in 2001). In 
contrast, both the Yale and Harvard endowments, pioneer investors in that asset class, have private 
equity portfolios worth around $5 billion. The emergence of very large investors goes hand in hand 
with the disintermediation of private equity. Large investors either co-invest alongside funds or 
even bypass funds altogether (Fang, Fang, Ivashina, and Lerner (2013)).  
Using a large-scale survey, we show that institutional investors exhibit considerable 
heterogeneity in their structure, behavior, and investment criteria, and that the amount of capital 
allocated to private equity is its foremost driver. Other characteristics that broadly capture prestige 
and long-term relationships (e.g., investor type, tenure, total asset under management, and location) 
play virtually no role. The rapid concentration in the asset management industry should therefore 
significantly change the characteristics of the average investor.  
Our findings also have implications for the organizational design of institutional investors. 
For example, let us evaluate the potential benefit from investing in private equity for the Norwegian 
or Chinese Sovereign Wealth funds — two of the largest investors in the world, yet private equity 
novices. On the one hand, it might be thought that it would be difficult for these investors to enter 
   27
private equity because they have little experience and lack long standing relationship with funds. 
On the other hand, perhaps all you need is cash. If you have cash, you can assemble a large team of 
competent people that will be effective at negotiating, screening and monitoring. From our 
evidence, the latter is more likely to hold true; that is, the case for private equity investing is 
stronger for large albeit new investors, all else being equal. 
 Let us consider a second example. Following the perceived success of large endowment in 
venture capital (e.g. Yale University), several small endowments have targeted aggressive 
allocation to private equity.18 If what explains investor heterogeneity is investors’ type (such as 
endowment versus pension fund) this move is warranted, but if the source of heterogeneity is size, 
as we find here, this move cannot be justified on the grounds of just being an endowment. Our 
findings show the benefits for investors in pooling resources either directly or via fund-of-funds.19 
This may provide a rationale for the current trend in the consolidation of money management in the 
pension fund industry. For example, larger pension funds in the Netherlands (e.g., APG and 
PGGM) obtain mandates from smaller pension funds to invest in certain asset classes, 
predominantly alternative assets. In Canada, large Canadian pension plans such as Ontario 
Teachers’ Pension Plan and OMERS are discussing similar moves. Oxford University created a 
university endowment that is the collection of a number of smaller Oxford colleges’ endowments. 
This university-wide endowment is targeting a much larger private equity allocation than the 
colleges were aiming at before the merge.  
In contrast, Swedish pension funds were split in five independent funds (AP1, AP2, AP3, 
AP4 and AP6) because the government did not want most of the country’s equity to be concentrated 
in one hand. If these pension funds invest in private equity independently, they each carry their due 
diligence, negotiate terms and conditions, monitor independently. There are talks in Sweden about 
                                                            
18 “The success of Harvard and Yale attracted imitators. After suffering endowment losses in 2001 and 2002, smaller 
schools looked to their Ivy League idols for guidance on bullet-proofing their portfolios. ... Alumni called me up and 
said, ‘We’re going to be just like Yale, right?’ recalls the CIO of one midsize endowment fund. As a result, many small 
schools crowded into hedge funds and private equity (…)” Institutional Investor, November 4th, 2009. 
19 This also implies an additional layer of fees and potential conflicts of interest, which we do not quantify here. 
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merging them back together and evidence in this paper shows the potential benefits of doing so in 
an asset class such as private equity. 
In addition to opening the black-box of investors’ organizational and decision-making 
processes in a major asset class, this paper shows that investor size is a sufficient statistic to capture 
multiple aspects of investor heterogeneity. The literature tackling issues related to investor size 
focuses mainly on returns of financial intermediaries: in pension funds. This paper, in contrast, 
focuses on the interaction between organizational structure and actions (not returns).20 We focus on 
what is arguably the most complex and specialized type of assets to which investors allocate capital 
– private equity. The answer to these questions relates to the Economics of both firm boundary and 
team size/specialization trade-offs; it also relates to a literature debating which investor 
characteristic matters in complex and specialized asset classes. 
To sum up, our results say that if the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund invests 1% of its 
capital in private equity (i.e. $7.5 billion) it is expected to be ‘just like’ Yale with 30% of its $20 
billion fund allocated to private equity. What drives differences between investors in our sample is 
only the dollar amount invested. We expect the same type of due diligence, same type of PE fund 
terms and conditions, same type of investment criteria despite the difference in history and asset 
allocation choices.21  
   
                                                            
20 There is also a large literature studying the interaction between organizational structure and return. E.g. Dass, Nanda, 
and Wang (2013) show how returns differ between sole- and team-managed mutual funds. Although we have some 
return information for the majority of the investors in our sample, we chose not to use it because in private equity the 
time lapse between decision to invest and realized return is about ten years. Hence in such asset classes, we would need 
to know the organizational structure in each of the past years, going well beyond ten years back which, even if it were 
feasible, would shrink the sample size dramatically both in terms of the number of investors and number of decisions.  
21 This observation is echoed in an interview of Bruce Feldman, former head of alternatives at the Pennsylvania State 
Employees’ Retirement System: “One of the more significant changes he saw in the industry during his time at the 
system was the gradual divergence of certain limited partners from the rest of the pack, separated by their ability to get 
favourable treatment from general partners not available to other investors. The ability to influence the terms of the 
transaction changed. Money always talked, but [it used to be], the earlier one could get involved with the GP (…) The 
longer I did the job, the more I realised the industry evolved. Key LPs emerged who were much more influential in how 
the partnership was structured. In many cases they were able to negotiate more favourable arrangements for themselves, 
for example, in side vehicles or other arrangements.” Feldman’s observation reflects a growing tension among LPs over 
the issue of big investors having access to better terms and conditions, co-investment opportunities and even separate 
accounts customised specifically for them. 
(http://www.privateequitymanager.com/Article.aspx?article=68923) 
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Table 1 – Main investor characteristics and sample representativeness
This table shows descriptive statistics for the variables defined in section 2.2. PEI Universe is the
list of investors contained in the 2008 Private Equity International (PEI) Directory. Our sample
includes only respondents providing their type (Panel A), location (Panel B), amount of private
equity capital under management (Panel C) and year of first investment in private equity (Panel D).
Panel A: LP type
Investor type Definition Obs. Fraction in
our sample
Fraction in
PEI Universe
Pension funds Public and corporate pension funds 72 23% 19%
Fund-of-funds 58 19% 11%
Endowments Endowments and foundations 43 14% 18%
Fin. firms Banks, insurance companies, asset managers 70 23% 27%
Other types Family desks, governments, corporations 64 21% 25%
Panel B: Region of LP location
Region Definition Obs. Fraction in
our sample
Fraction in
PEI Universe
North America USA and Canada 98 32% 52%
Continental Europe Europe excluding UK and Scandinavia 80 26% 16%
Scandinavia Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland 39 13% 5%
UK 35 11% 8%
Australia 18 6% 4%
Japan 13 4% 4%
Rest of the World 24 8% 11%
Panel C: Amount of private equity capital under management (LP size)
LP size (2008; $ million)
Obs. Fraction in
our sample
Fraction in
PEI Universe
0 ≤ . < 100  73 24% 30%
100 ≤ . < 250 48 16% 16%
250 ≤ . < 600 64 21% 15%
600 ≤ . < 2000 62 20% 20%
. ≥ 2000 60 20% 19%
Panel D: LP experience
2008 minus the year firm started to invest in PE
Obs. Fraction in
our sample
Fraction in
PEI Universe
0  ≤ . < 4 years  60 19% 16%
4 ≤ . < 7 years 40 13% 15%
7 ≤ . < 10 years 72 23% 18%
10 ≤ . < 15 years 70 23% 20%
. ≥ 15 years 65 22% 31%
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Table 2: Organization Structure and Human Resources
This table provides descriptive statistics for the variables relating to LP organizational structure and
human resources management. Variables are defined in section 3.1. Panel A reports statistics for
continuous variables and Panel B for binary variables.
Panel A: Descriptive statistics: continuous variables
Mean Percentile Number of
25th 75th observations
Parent experience (years) 37.72 9.00 41.00 299
Parent size ($ billion) 27.82 0.59 13.30 270
Number of PE professionals 7.80 1.50 8.00 220
Number of Investment Committed (IC) members 6.72 4.00 8.00 211
Private equity allocation (%) 0.35 0.04 0.77 270
Number of funds held 45.08 10.00 62.00 201
Funds per PE professional 16.83 4.00 20.00 176
Dollars per PE professional ($ million) 202.61 47.82 288.90 220
Average IC members experience (years) 11.13 6.84 14.45 160
IC turnover 0.26 0.00 0.40 126
Fraction of fund-of-funds in portfolio 0.18 0.00 0.33 188
Panel B: Descriptive statistics: binary variables
Answers: yes (=1), no (=0)
Frequency
Number of
observations
PE team also manages hedge funds 0.25 296
PE team also manages real estate 0.38 296
Outsource some due diligence or monitoring activities 0.48 217
Do you have an Investment Committee (IC)? 0.82 268
Are IC decisions taken by majority voting? 0.24 255
Are the IC decisions completely autonomous? 0.79 158
Is part of the IC compensation related to financial
performance? 0.45 220
. If yes, Is the bonus larger than the fixed salary? 0.38 92
Do other investment professionals receive a bonus? 0.47 217
. If yes, Is the bonus larger than the fixed salary? 0.28 90
. Has the compensation policy changed over the past 10
years? 0.32 218
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Table 3: LP size and team specialization
This table reports results from Probit and Tobit regressions. The dependent variable differs in each
specification. In column (i) the dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value one if
the team in charge of private equity is also in charge of hedge fund investing, and zero otherwise. In
column (ii) the dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the team in
charge of private equity is also in charge of real estate investing, and is zero otherwise. In column
(iii) the dependent variable is the percentage of the PE portfolio that is invested in fund-of-funds.
The explanatory variables are defined in section 2.2. Specifications (i) and (ii) are estimated by
Probit, and specification (iii) by Tobit. A constant is included but not shown. t-statistics are
reported in italics between parentheses. Significance levels in regressions are indicated by a (1%), b
(5%), and c (10%).
(i)
Team also manages
Hedge Funds
(ii)
Team also manages
Real Estate
(iii)
% fund-of-funds
in PE portfolio
LP size (log) -0.21a -0.13a -0.04a
(-3.83) (-2.69) (-2.99)
Pension funds 0.78a 0.91a 0.20a
(3.31) (4.35) (3.45)
Endowments 1.18a 1.59a 0.14c
(4.13) (5.27) (1.72)
Financial Firms 0.53b 0.16 0.05
(2.13) (0.71) (0.84)
North America -0.07 -0.11 -0.04
(-0.32) (-0.54) (-0.78)
Continental Europe -0.32 -0.13 0.11b
(-1.33) (-0.63) (2.06)
LP experience (log) 0.04 -0.07 0.03
(0.28) (-0.51) (0.91)
Parent experience (log) 0.10 0.06 -0.01
(1.13) (0.73) (-0.56)
(OLS) R-square 20.6 25.1 12.5
Number of observations 296 296 188
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Table 4: Measuring the scope of investor activities
This table shows the frequency and number of observations for the dummy variables that capture
investor activities and are defined in section 4. Column (i) reports the frequency for the whole
sample, and columns (ii) and (iii) for the sub-samples of small and large investors. Small investors
are those in the bottom LP size tercile, while large investors are those in the top LP size tercile. The
bottom row reports the scaled investor activity scope measure averaged across LPs which is defined
in section 4.5. We require a minimum of three valid entries to compute an scaled investor activity
scope measure of scope.
Number
of
observations
Frequency
(i)
All
investors
(ii)
Small
investors
(iii)
Large
investors
Accounting activities
1 Use own fair value of unrealized investments 176 0.31 0.21 0.52
Actuarial activities
2 Always calculate own GP past performance measure 229 0.58 0.49 0.74
3 Always benchmark GP track record 225 0.81 0.70 0.93
Legal activities
4 Benchmark contracts (LPAs) 229 0.67 0.59 0.73
5 Always obtain side letters 216 0.45 0.23 0.73
6 Always obtain ‘Most Favored Nation’ clause 210 0.39 0.18 0.61
7 Always negotiate contract terms 214 0.63 0.43 0.82
Investment activities
8 Has co-invested alongside a PE fund 232 0.56 0.35 0.73
9 Always interview portfolio company executives 235 0.43 0.36 0.53
Monitoring activities
10 Has advisory board seats on some PE funds 216 0.50 0.29 0.68
11 Track PE portfolio mix (industry/size/country) 219 0.84 0.77 0.93
12 Has visited portfolio companies 206 0.68 0.51 0.85
Scaled investor activity scope measure 299 0.50 0.37 0.62
35
Table 5: Determinants of the scope of investor activities
This table reports results from Tobit regressions models where the dependent variable is the scaled
investor activity score measure defined in section 4.5; this variable takes values between zero and
one. The explanatory variables common to all specifications are defined in section 2.2; the other
explanatory variables are defined in section 3.1. A constant is included but not shown. t-statistics
are reported in italics between parentheses. Significance levels in regressions are indicated by a
(1%), b (5%), and c (10%).
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
LP size (log) 0.06a 0.05a 0.08a 0.07a 0.07a 0.07a
(5.16) (4.43) (7.61) (8.31) (8.50) (7.57)
Pension funds -0.10b 0.00 -0.03 0.01 -0.09b -0.05
(-2.33) (0.05) (-0.70) (0.21) (-2.17) (-1.33)
Fund-of-funds 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.08c 0.07
(1.45) (0.87) (0.65) (1.08) (1.81) (1.49)
Endowments -0.09c 0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.09c -0.06
(-1.72) (0.55) (-0.16) (0.50) (-1.84) (-1.13)
Financial Firms -0.08b -0.09b -0.08b -0.09b -0.06 -0.07
(-2.05) (-2.22) (-1.99) (-2.34) (-1.63) (-1.64)
North America 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00
(0.31) (0.72) (0.62) (0.69) (0.26) (0.14)
Continental Europe -0.04 0.00 -0.07b -0.01 -0.05 -0.03
(-1.30) (-0.08) (-1.99) (-0.20) (-1.44) (-1.00)
LP experience -0.04 -0.06a -0.07a -0.06a -0.04 -0.04c
(-1.60) (-2.63) (-2.79) (-2.72) (-1.60) (-1.77)
Parent experience -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
(-1.22) (-0.13) (0.86) (0.31) (-1.07) (-0.42)
Parent size (log) 0.02c
(1.74)
Number of PE professionals 0.07a
(2.92)
Funds per PE professional -0.02a
(-2.76)
Dollar per PE professional -0.02a
(-3.04)
PE allocation (%) -0.06
(-1.58)
Performance-based salary 0.04
(1.27)
(OLS) R-square 36.5 40.7 43.5 40.8 35.8 35.3
Number of observations 222 193 156 193 223 218
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Table 6: Robustness tests
This table reports results from Tobit regressions models where the dependent variable is the scaled
investor activity score measure defined in section 4.5; this variable takes values between zero and
one.. The explanatory variables are defined in section 2.2. A constant is included but not shown. t-
statistics are reported in italics between parentheses. Significance levels in regressions are indicated
by a (1%), b (5%), and c (10%).
Exclude from the
sample:
(i)
LPs investing more
in VC than in BO
(ii)
LPs whose allocation
depends most on their
own past performance
(iii)
Fund-of-
funds
(iv)
LPs that started
before 1998
LP size (log) 0.08a 0.07a 0.08a 0.06a
(6.21) (7.58) (8.82) (5.77)
Pension funds -0.11c -0.08c -0.06c -0.11b
(-1.89) (-1.82) (-1.68) (-1.98)
Fund-of-funds -0.04 0.09c 0.01
(-0.58) (1.77) (0.24)
Endowments -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 -0.08
(-0.19) (-1.11) (-1.23) (-1.07)
Financial Firms -0.10 -0.10b -0.06 -0.10c
(-1.61) (-2.29) (-1.57) (-1.75)
North America 0.08c 0.01 0.01 0.00
(1.66) (0.35) (0.30) (-0.00)
Continental
Europe -0.07 -0.03 -0.05 -0.07
(-1.48) (-0.80) (-1.33) (-1.61)
LP experience -0.03 0.00 -0.04b -0.02
(-0.97) (0.00) (-2.01) (-0.56)
Parent experience -0.04b -0.01 -0.01 -0.03c
(-1.97) (-0.89) (-0.92) (-1.91)
(OLS) R-square 45.0 45.9 32.6 35.2
Number of obs. 92 147 194 111
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Table 7: LP size and time spent on due diligence
This table reports results from OLS and Probit regressions. In the first three columns the
dependent variable is a the number of (full-time-equivalent) days spent on due diligence (in-house
and outsourced) for different types of private equity funds. In column (i) the due diligence is for
first time funds, in column (ii) for first investments in a fund operated by an already active
(‘seasoned’) GP, and in column (iii) for re-investments in funds operated by GPs into which the
LP has already invested (‘re-up’). In column (iv) the dependent variable is a dummy variable that
takes the value one if part of the due diligence activities are outsourced (and zero otherwise). The
explanatory variables are defined in section 2.2. Specifications (i), (ii), and (iii) are estimated by
OLS, and specification (iv) by Probit. A constant is included but not shown. t-statistics are
reported in italics between parentheses. Significance levels in regressions are indicated by a (1%),
b (5%), and c (10%).
Time spent on due diligence for:
(i)
investing in a
first-time fund
(ii)
first investment in
a seasoned fund
(iii)
a re-up
(iv)
Outsource some
due diligence
LP size (log) 6.95a 4.05a 4.09a -0.04
(4.32) (3.48) (4.00) (-0.68)
Pension funds -2.06 -6.37 -4.49 0.63a
(-0.31) (-1.25) (-1.02) (2.65)
Endowments 0.80 -2.55 -2.88 0.63c
(0.09) (-0.38) (-0.50) (1.90)
Financial Firms 0.84 3.75 1.15 -0.39
(0.14) (0.85) (0.30) (-1.58)
North America 5.05 -3.75 0.64 -0.59a
(0.92) (-0.90) (0.18) (-2.63)
Continental Europe 1.21 -6.39 -3.33 -0.41c
(0.19) (-1.41) (-0.85) (-1.80)
LP experience (log) -6.78 -1.30 -0.38 -0.29c
(-1.47) (-0.39) (-0.13) (-1.90)
Parent experience (log) 1.31 -1.08 -0.81 0.19b
(0.49) (-0.54) (-0.47) (1.97)
(OLS) R-square 24.4 16.5 17.7 15.5
Number of observations 72 107 107 217
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Table 8: Number of employees and LP size – Regression analysis
This table reports results from OLS regressions whose dependent variable is the number of PE
professionals employed by LPs. The explanatory variables are defined in section 2.2; LP size is
measured in US dollars billion. t-statistics based on robust standard errors are reported in italics
between parentheses. Significance levels in regressions are indicated by a (1%), b (5%), and c
(10%).
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Constant 3.99a 2.97a 2.68a 2.37a
(7.00) (5.52) (5.28) (2.81)
LP size 2.28a 3.41a 2.76a 2.65a
(9.61) (7.39) (4.70) (4.08)
LP size squared -0.04b -0.04b -0.03
(-2.54) (-2.40) (-1.43)
Number of PE funds 0.01 0.03
(0.72) (0.68)
Number of PE funds squared 0.00
(-0.62)
R-square 58.4 60.7 44.8 44.9
Number of observations 220 220 166 166
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Table 9: LP size, number of employees and scope of activities– Decile analysis
This table shows statistics on the number of employee and scope of activities based on LP size deciles. Variables are defined in section 2.2; LP size is
measured in in US dollars million. ‘Scope of activities’ is the scaled investor activity score measure defined in section 4.5.
LP size
Number of LPs
in the decile
Mean Mean
Minimum
(excluded)
Maximum
(included)
Mean
Number of
PE professionals
Number of
PE funds
Scope of
activities
PE professionals
per fund
0.0 41.8 26.9 16 1.09 11.69 0.38 0.09
41.8 101.7 72.1 15 1.67 11.33 0.43 0.15
101.7 183.0 135.7 16 2.76 20.75 0.50 0.13
183.0 292.7 242.0 18 4.03 26.33 0.56 0.15
292.7 417.9 350.3 14 3.68 27.57 0.57 0.13
417.9 600.6 499.1 15 3.73 47.27 0.58 0.08
600.6 876.0 733.6 15 8.75 51.80 0.60 0.17
876.0 1,924.7 1,394.7 16 8.94 87.56 0.73 0.10
1,924.7 3,659.2 2,657.3 16 11.19 79.44 0.74 0.14
3,659.2 35,000.0 8,533.1 15 21.53 100.47 0.79 0.21
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Table 10: Fund selection criteria – Regression Analysis
This table reports results from Tobit regressions. Dependent variables are standardized score of
investor selection criteria; scores range on a Likert scale from zero (the criterion is irrelevant) to
five (the criterion is crucial). The standardization consists in subtracting the average answer of an
investor across all of the questions and dividing by the standard deviation (i.e. building a z-score
for each question and each investor). The explanatory variables are defined in section 2.2. A
constant is included but not shown. t-statistics are shown in italics between parenthesis.
Significance levels in regressions are indicated by a (1%), b (5%), and c (10%).
(i)
Commitments
by other LPs
(ii)
Advisor or
gatekeeper
opinion
(iii)
Multiple of
previous
funds
(iv)
Fund
size
(v)
Valuation of
unrealized
investments
LP size (log) -0.10a -0.12b 0.08b 0.13a 0.11a
(-3.10) (-2.54) (2.46) (4.05) (3.48)
Pension funds -0.12 0.29 0.15 -0.30b 0.10
(-0.87) (1.47) (1.01) (-1.99) (0.73)
Fund-of-funds -0.28c -0.15 0.29b -0.25 0.16
(-1.90) (-0.81) (2.17) (-1.39) (0.91)
Endowments -0.23 0.09 -0.15 0.08 -0.09
(-1.31) (0.34) (-0.98) (0.38) (-0.47)
Financial Firms 0.10 -0.24 0.05 -0.11 0.18
(0.62) (-1.31) (0.35) (-0.78) (1.22)
North America -0.01 0.22 -0.08 0.07 -0.07
(-0.10) (1.23) (-0.69) (0.50) (-0.70)
Continental Europe 0.19 0.10 -0.11 -0.15 0.08
(1.32) (0.75) (-1.03) (-1.13) (0.62)
LP experience 0.08 -0.02 -0.09 -0.16b -0.02
(0.90) (-0.18) (-1.11) (-2.11) (-0.23)
Parent experience 0.03 0.06 0.06 -0.01 -0.06
(0.62) (0.90) (1.32) (-0.13) (-1.47)
(OLS) R-square 11.1 12.8 12.1 9.3 17.9
Number of obs. 191 191 173 191 172
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Figure 1: Histogram of the investor scope of activities
The figure reports the histogram for the scaled investor scope of activity score variable defined in
section 4.5.
